Abstract-Providing incentives for user contribution has been one of the primary design goals of Peer-to-Peer systems. The newly-emerged BitTorrent private communities adopt Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE) on top of BitTorrent's incentive mechanism, Tit-For-Tat, in order to strictly enforce a minimum contribution a member has to provide, in relation to the amount of service it has received.
I. INTRODUCTION
BitTorrent is a popular peer-to-peer (P2P) protocol for file distribution over the Internet. One of the keys of its success lies in its Tit-For-Tat (TFT) incentive policy, which works reasonably well in fostering cooperation among downloading peers (also known as leechers). However, TFT does not provide any incentive for peers to remain in the system after the download is complete, in order to seed the entire file to others. Furthermore, it has been shown that TFT is vulnerable to attacks such as the large view exploit [11] , by means of which a peer succeeds in achieving a good download speed without uploading any data in return.
In recent years, there has been a large proliferation of socalled private BitTorrent communities aiming at overcoming the above issues. These sites typically require users to register accounts and then demand that their members maintain a sharing ratio, i.e., the ratio between a peer's total upload and download amounts, above a particular threshold. This mechanism is known under the name of Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE) 1 . Community members whose sharing ratio drops below the threshold are warned and then banned from downloading, or even expelled from the community. In this way, it is guaranteed that each participant provides a certain level of contribution to the community. Furthermore, since 1 The sharing ratio is calculated and recorded by the trackers deployed by each community.
it is normally difficult to obtain a membership for a private BitTorrent community, the threat of the white-washing attack 2 is very low. On the other hand, to make SRE realistic and feasible, most private communities adopt some special rules. For example, new members normally are provided with a bonus to get started (e.g., in HDChina [5] the first download is for free).
Several measurement studies show that SRE is very effective in boosting cooperation [7] , [5] , [12] , [2] . For instance, [7] reports seeder-to-leecher ratios that are at least 9 times higher than in public BT communities, while download speeds are measured to be 3-5 higher. Hence it would be beneficial to analyze how SRE actually provides seeding incentives and quantify the expected performance improvement, in terms of user download speeds. In this work we focus on these aspects. Specifically, our contributions are: 1) We provide an analytical model for bandwidthheterogeneous private communities, which characterizes the inherent relationship between a peer's performance and the parameters of SRE. 2) We apply our model both to a single swarm and across multiple swarms, and we quantify the performance improvement/deterioration for peers with different capacities, assuming rational user behavior. 3) We analyze the factors that build up SRE's influence, i.e., the SRE threshold, and the bandwidth heterogeneity of the peers in the system. 4) We show that, due to the influence of irrational user behavior observed in real private communities, i.e., some peers seed more than they need and achieve sharing ratios (much) higher than the threshold [5] , the expected download speeds derived in our model represent a lower bound for the actual download speeds achievable by peers.
Hence, following our model, administrators of private communities can predict the minimum performance level their systems will be able to reach.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL FOR PRIVATE BITTORRENT COMMUNITIES

A. Preliminary: rational user behavior
For the purpose of our analysis, we consider a user to be rational if it tries to maximize its download speed and minimize its seeding work. This means that when SRE is adopted, rational peers seed the minimum amount to meet the threshold and, when SRE is not adopted, peers immediately leave the system once their downloads are complete.
Furthermore, we assume that rational peers always upload at their full capacity, since a recent study [5] has shown that when using TFT, uploading at the full capacity is the best strategy for peers to maximize their download speed. Finally, in accordance with previous work [8] , we do not consider the piece availability problem and assume that peers can always find pieces that they are interested in at other peers.
B. The basic model
We consider a BitTorrent swarm in which peers are downloading and uploading pieces of the same file. We assume that the system is in steady state: while peers are arriving and departing, the total size of the population is constant. We group peers into different classes according to their upload capacities, and assume that the upload bandwidth allocated to each class is equally shared by all the leechers in that class. The notation used in our model is illustrated in Table I. Given the above assumptions, we can derive that within a time interval T , there will be T x i /t i leechers in class i who will have completed their downloads, where t i is their average download time and x i is the number of leechers in class i in a steady state at any given time. We assume that T is long enough so that we can get an average performance for peers in each class. The conservation law applied to the bandwidths implies that, in this interval, the total download amount must be equal to the total upload amount, i.e.:
where T i denotes the total length of time a peer has spent in the swarm (both as a leecher and as a seeder). For a swarm where peers do not seed (i.e., T i = t i ), and considering that the download speed d i of a peer in class i equals F/t i , Eq. 1 becomes:
C. Applying sharing ratio enforcement within one swarm
We first analyze how SRE influences the system performance when it is applied within one swarm. Under this situation, once a leecher's sharing ratio drops below the threshold, its download process is halted immediately: it needs to upload for a while until it gains enough sharing ratio to perform further downloading. When it completes the download, the peer leaves the swarm immediately (hence T i = t i ), with a sharing ratio no less than the SRE threshold α. It should be noticed that this scenario does not actually take place in a private BitTorrent community, but it is useful for deriving the seeding incentive provided by SRE.
We call ϕ
• i the sharing ratio a leecher in class i would obtain in a swarm where SRE is not applied. When SRE is applied, if ϕ • i < α, peers in class i will be banned for some time during their downloads, so that their final sharing ratio ϕ i will be exactly equal to the threshold. While these peers are banned, their upload capacities will be allocated to the other peers in class j, where j ∈ {j, ϕ 
As an illustrative example, let us consider a swarm that consists of a class of slow peers with upload bandwidth μ s and a class of fast peers with upload bandwidth μ f . We assume that originally slow peers cannot achieve the SRE threshold when using only TFT. Eq. 3 implies that:
It is easy to verify that when α < 1 (which is the case in most private communities), it will always hold that ϕ f > 1. For example, when x s = x f , μ f = 4μ s , and α = 0.9, we have d s = 10μ s /9, d f = 35μ s /9, and ϕ f = 36/35 > 1. This implies that fast peers who originally could achieve the SRE threshold will still be able to achieve it, though their download speed is increased due to the extra bandwidth allocated to them.
D. Applying sharing ratio enforcement within multiple swarms
To avoid getting a worse performance, it is reasonable for a peer who cannot achieve the SRE threshold while leeching, to seed for a while before starting another download. In this way, it will gain some sharing ratio as deposit, and spend it for its next download. We assume that in a BitTorrent community containing a number of different files (each associated with a different swarm), peers that are interested in multiple files will download them one after another. We do not consider parallel downloads, since a peer who downloads n files simultaneously can be considered as being n different peers, each having 1/n of the original upload capacity. For the same reason, we do not consider parallel seeding either.
The flow of peers within multiple swarms is shown in Fig. 1 : if, after completing its download in swarm a, a leecher meets the SRE threshold (i.e., ϕ i ≥ α), it can directly join another one (swarm b in the figure) if it wishes so. Otherwise (ϕ i < α), to keep its community membership, the peer needs to turn into a seeder, and seed for a while in swarm a. Its seeding amount should compensate its upload deficiency, i.e., the required upload amount minus the actual upload amount:
For simplicity of presentation, we assume that all swarms are of an identical configuration, i.e., the files are of the same size (F ), the compositions of peers are the same 3 . Within a long time period T , in a particular swarm there will be T x i /t i leechers in class i who have completed their downloads. If ϕ i < α, each of these leechers will turn into a seeder and seed (α − ϕ i )F amount of data. The conservation law implies that, in this interval, the total download amount must be equal to the total upload amount, i.e.:
where the two terms on the right side account for the contributions of leechers and seeders, respectively. Let μ i = (α − ϕ i )F/t i , then, similarly to Eq. 1 in Section II-B, Eq. 5 can be simplified to:
To this end, given that the resource allocation is only determined by TFT, the average download speed of a peer in class i can be calculated according to the model proposed in our previous work [4] :
3 It should be noted that we can perform the same analysis for swarms of different configurations by simply adding a coefficient in our equations.
where D ji (S ji ) specifies the fraction of bandwidth allocated from a leecher (seeder) in class j to leechers in class i in the BitTorrent protocol. The accuracy of this model has been demonstrated through simulations [4] .
Note that the term on the right side of Eq. 6 is equal to i,ϕi<α x i (μ i + μ i ) + i,ϕi≥α x i μ i , which implies that the upload performed by a peer in class i (as a leecher and later as a seeder), where i ∈ {i, ϕ i < α}, is equivalent to it uploading (only as a leecher) at a speed equal to μ i + μ i . In both cases it exactly achieves the SRE threshold. Hence, (μ i + μ i )/d i = α, from which we can calculate μ i as:
and solve the system of equations in Eq. 7.
As an illustrative example, let us consider again a system with two classes. Assuming that the sharing ratio obtained by slow peers when using only TFT is below the SRE threshold, from Eqs. 7 and 8 it follows that:
Here D ij and S ij are determined by the design of TFT and network settings. We use the default TFT settings as in the BitTorrent main client, i.e., peers open 5 upload slots, among which one is used for optimistic unchoke [6] . Then, for the following network settings: 
III. ANALYSIS
Based on our model, in this section we analyze the performance of SRE both when it is applied to a single swarm and to multiple swarms. Unless stated otherwise, we consider a system with two classes of peers, fast (with an upload capacity μ f equal to 2048 Kbps) and slow (with an upload capacity μ s equal to 512 Kbps) peers. We believe this simplified version of upload capacity setting is already enough for our analysis, though more complicated capacity distribution can also be used. By default, there is the same number of fast and slow peers, and the SRE threshold α is set to 0.9.
We use two metrics to evaluate SRE's performance, i.e., the average download speed and the sharing ratio, and we consider three factors influencing SRE's performance, i.e., the SRE threshold α, the fraction of fast peers, and the upload capacity ratio between fast and slow peers.
A. Applying sharing ratio enforcement within one swarm: better reciprocity but worse overall performance
We first analyze the effects of using SRE within one swarm only. In Figs. 2, 3 , and 4, TFT alone is compared to TFT with SRE. As expected, SRE helps in enhancing reciprocity. In fact, the download speed of fast peers, who have a higher sharing ratio than slow peers under all considered scenarios, is higher when sharing ratio is enforced, as compared to the case when only TFT is applied. However we note that, for certain settings, i.e., when the threshold is too low (Fig. 3) or when the upload capacity ratio of the two classes of peers is small (Fig. 4) , SRE has a limited influence on the performance. Hence, knowing the capacity distribution of peers is important to make the use of SRE most effective. Furthermore, in line with our previous work [4] , we note (Figs. 2(a), 3(a) , and 4(a)) that enhancing reciprocity deteriorates the overall download performance in the system. These findings suggest that applying SRE within one swarm is a very strict way to enhance reciprocity: a peer's performance depends only on its upload capacity. Hence, this method might be useful for administrators of private communities to exclude low-capacity peers.
B. Applying sharing ratio enforcement within multiple swarms: good incentives for seeding and better overall performance
In this section, we analyze the effects of SRE's when peers' sharing ratios are calculated across multiple swarms. As we can observe in Figs. 5, 6, and 7, the seeding work performed by peers in order to comply with the SRE threshold results in a higher download speed for peers in all classes, as well as in a better overall download performance in the system. Furthermore, this performance improvement is increased with a higher SRE threshold, a higher fraction of fast peers, or a larger upload capacity ratio of the two classes of peers.
Hence, applying SRE within multiple swarms translates into seeding incentives for those peers that cannot comply with the SRE threshold by only leeching. This represents a win-win situation where all peers are provided with a better service due to the increased bandwidth supply.
C. Comparison with the real private BitTorrent communities
In our model, we have only considered rational user behavior, i.e., peers only seed the minimum amount they are required to. In a real private community, this is not always the case. Several measurement studies [5] , [2] show that instead of following the enforcement rationally, many users prefer to seed more than they need, and thus achieve sharing ratios much higher than required. For example, in HDChina, a popular private community that has over 18,000 registered users, over 90% of the users have a sharing ratio higher than one [5] ; while in another popular community, CHDBits, the top 250 users possess a sharing ratio higher than 10 [2] . This suggests that the potential risk of being expelled from a community due to an insufficient commitment psychologically manipulates users' behavior.
Given the existence of this irrational user behavior, the results derived in our model can be seen as a lower bound for the performance improvement provided by SRE, as we formally prove now. Proof: Given the rational user behavior assumed in our model, the second term in the numerator of Eq. 9 specifies the minimum bandwidth allocated from class j seeders to class i leechers, where μ j = (α − ϕ j )F/t j . Due to possible irrational user behavior, the sharing ratios achieved by peers in a private community swarm might be much diverse but, nevertheless, not less than α. Let B i = (A i − ϕ i )F/t i , where A i is the average sharing ratio achieved by a peer in class i, i.e., A i ≥ α. Similarly to our analysis in Section II-D, we calculate the average download speed d i in a swarm with possible irrational user behavior as follows:
Theorem. In a BitTorrent
Because
IV. RELATED WORK
Most existing studies on BitTorrent incentive policies focus on TFT and its variations [3] , [6] , [10] , [4] . To date, only few works analyze private BitTorrent communities. Andrade et al. [1] focus on the dynamics of resource demand and supply, and one of their most interesting findings is that a small set of users contributes most of the resources, but the users that provide more resources are also those that demand more. Rahman et al. [9] introduced and studied the credit crunch and crash problem, and they provide a novel credit intervention mechanism that proactively stops the system seizing. Zhang et al. [12] investigated hundreds of private trackers and depicted a broad and clear picture of the private community landscape. Chen et al. [2] compared system behaviors among 13 private trackers and 2 public trackers, and they showed their differences regarding user viscosity, single torrent evolution, user behaviors, and content distribution. While these studies all focus on demonstrating the properties of private communities based on measurements or simulations, we provide a theoretical model to analyze SRE's influence on the system performance. Liu et al. [5] developed a model to analyze SRE as well, based on a game theory approach.
While they show the existence of a Nash Equilibrium and the conditions to achieve it, our model quantifies the lower bound of the performance improvement when using SRE, and we further study the influence of the SRE threshold and the bandwidth heterogeneity of the peers in the system.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we have provided an analytical model that captures the essence of SRE adopted by private BitTorrent communities. Due to the existence of "irrational" seeding behavior observed in real private communities, our model represents a lower bound for the average download speed that peers can achieve. Based on our model, we show that applying SRE within a single swarm is a possible way for administrators of private communities to enhance reciprocity, or to exclude low-capacity peers. On the other hand, applying SRE across multiple swarms provides seeding incentives, and these seeding resources lead to a better overall download performance. We furthermore show that the performance of SRE is increased by 1) a higher fraction of high-capacity peers, 2) a higher SRE threshold, and 3) a larger upload capacity ratio in peers' capacities.
As future work, we plan to extend our model so as to include different user behavior (e.g., the irrational seeding behavior), and analyze the influence on the system performance.
